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‘IN THE PLACE OF A COMMON CULTURE, WHAT?’ 
NICK COULDRY, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS1  
 
The traditional notion of ‘community’ rests, on a close mapping of two things: the 
times and spaces where we live and are governed, and our sense (both cognitive and 
emotional) of commonality, of connection. But for all of us, even if in different ways 
and to different degrees, those things are being pulled apart. If you have lived, as I 
have, in an even moderately busy urban street, it makes sense, even if a weird kind of 
sense, that you do not speak to the person, living two doors down from you, who 
tends to go to work at the same time as you, even if (as in one bizarre case that 
happened to me) it turns out that person ends their journey to work only a few yards 
from where you do. On the other hand, it makes sense to experience and act out 
significant pleasure, when you meet only for the second time at a conference someone 
from a distant university with whom (apart from broad outlines of work 
specialisation) your life and its milieu have almost nothing in common. So there are 
good and bad sides, as always, to the stretching of time-space relations! But one effect 
is that any particular milieu is characterised by what the sociologist Martin Allbrow 
has called ‘time-space social stratification’ (1997: 52): our paths move in parallel with 
those of countless others we rarely see, so that, even when our paths do cross with 
theirs, the encounter may seem random rather than meaningful. 
 
There is good reason, then, to loosen the tie between ‘community’ and the defined 
geographical area and, as Gerard Delanty (2003) argues in his useful recent survey of 
the term, to allow for ‘communication communities’ which stretch in a huge range of 
ways across space and time. To hold onto the assumption that community is based, at 
a minimum, on the grouping of people in one place (as the Penguin Encyclopaedia of 
Sociology still does: Abercrombie et al., 2000) is to condemn our definition to 
irrelevance. But the opposite is not true: relaxing our definition of community in this 
way does not guarantee its relevance, or not, at least, if it is relevance to ‘politics’ we 
want. The term ‘politics’ is itself subject to continuous redefinition within debates 
over global human rights and cosmopolitanism.2 But, however we stretch and re-layer 
our concept of ‘politics’, the term is unimaginable without some meshing between, on 
the one hand, the ‘places’ where we live, work and are governed and, on the other 
hand, the places where we share with others something that impinges on how we are 
governed, something that might provide the matter of politics. For, as Chantal Mouffe 
in her book The Democratic Paradox has argued, ‘the logic of democracy does indeed 
imply a moment of closure which is required by the very process of constituting “the 
people” [which] cannot be avoided’, even if from a philosophical perspective we now 
insist on the paradoxical nature of that closure (Mouffe, 2000: 43). Democratic 
politics, Mouffe argues, drawing on Wittgenstein, requires some ‘form of life’, that is, 
a sufficient level of shared beliefs and ‘practice . . . aimed at persuading people to 
broaden the range of their commitments to others, to build a more inclusive 
community’ (2000: 65-66). Mouffe’s use of the term ‘community’ is striking, even 
surprising, in the deconstructionist context of her book, but the fact that she is driven 
to use it illustrates precisely the tension I now want to explore. 
 
The Problematic ‘Place’ of the Political 
 
This tension has troubled me in my own work on culture and media for some time. It 
is the conflict between two apparently irreconcilable pressures: on the one hand, the 
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push to root out and deconstruct any notions of ‘unity’ or ‘holism’ lurking behind the 
everyday political language of ‘society’, ‘state’, ‘culture’ and ‘community’ (not least 
in their media glosses)3 and, on the other hand, the pull back towards some notion of 
commonality without which any refounding of democratic politics seems impossible, 
even unimaginable. Where can we turn for the language, the concepts, the practices, 
that might express this commonality without unity?4 Before I go any further, let me 
acknowledge that to put things this way – to foreground the preconditions of political 
engagement – might seem , to some, an intolerable diversion, if the ultimate goal is to 
link back to politics itself. But it is a step that I believe is necessary, and one which 
cultural studies has an important role in helping us formulate effectively; I return to 
the link back to politics as such at the end. 
 
Taken at face value, the terms in Raymond Williams’ well-worn notion of ‘common 
culture’ seem unusable in resolving the tension I have outlined: ‘common’, because it 
assumes something held in common that we can no longer assume; and ‘culture’, 
because of its embedding in long-deconstructed metaphors of closure.5 But that does 
not mean we can abandon the conceptual site which Williams intended the term 
‘common culture’ to mark, which is why my title today tries to keep that site open. 
We can at least hope that some new term might come to reoccupy this place; without 
this, Williams was right, I believe, to say that ‘we shall not survive’ (1958: 304), or at 
least democratic politics shall not survive.  
 
How can this conceptual site be characterised, which Williams filled with the term 
‘common culture’? Mouffe writes of a contestatory democracy formed of ‘friendly 
enemies’, ‘who are friends because they share a common symbolic space’(2000: 13). 
But she does not hint how that common symbolic space might be created or sustained. 
This gap in her argument is symptomatic; it is common to both political science and 
political theory. We might hope for solutions in the fast-growing literature on 
citizenship but for all its richness there is, as yet, as Thomas Janoski and Brian Gras 
(2002: 42) recently pointed out, nothing there that captures ‘the informal aspects of 
citizenship integrating both the public and private sphere’, precisely the gap between 
lifeworld and public connection with which I began. Instead the value of citizenship 
studies may lie in the nakedness of the questions it asks: ‘what does it mean to belong 
to society . . .?’ (Stevenson, 2002: 4), ‘what counts as community and solidarity’ 
(Elliott, 2002: 55)?  
 
While such unanswered questions confirm the existence of a gap, I would want to go 
further and interpret this gap as symptomatic of a crisis in the practice of democracy 
itself, a crisis quite consistent with the survival (for now at least) of democratic 
values.6 This is partly a crisis in the dominant liberal model of democracy, which, as 
its critics (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984) have long argued, is a thin concept of 
democracy, capable of living with a permanently disengaged minority, but which 
finds it harder to live with a disengaged majority (Wolin, 1992). But the crisis extends 
wider; it is a problem for all who want to work with an older language of politics, that 
has been stretched beyond all recognition by the competing forces of 
detraditionalization, individualization and globalization. As a result, the crisis applies 
equally to radical versions of democratic politics. Let me illustrate this by surveying, 
quite critically, some recent, mainly philosophical, interventions towards the 
redefinition of ‘politics’, or at least the preconditions of political engagement. 
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Jacques Derrida has provided, perhaps, the most vivid image of the crisis. In Politics 
of Friendship he writes of how ‘the resonant echo of all the great [political] discourse’ 
now issues, increasingly, in ‘mad and impossible pleas, almost speechless warnings’. 
These warnings turn endlessly ‘like searchlights without a coast, they sweep across 
the dark sky, shut down or disappear at regular intervals and harbour the invisible in 
their very light’ (Derrida 1997: 81). For Derrida, the problem is a crisis in the nature 
of value itself, in ‘the value of value’ (ibid.). This cannot be addressed through some 
reworked democratic bond based on community, or ‘fraternity’, in any substantive 
sense, because it is the unsustainability of such political ‘substances’ that is the 
problem. Instead Derrida recalls Aristotle’s concept of ‘friendship’, but with a sense, 
derived from Blanchot, of mutual strangeness and separation (Derrida 1997: 294). But 
what contexts, what reference-points, does Derrida give us for thinking about this new 
politics, and how it might be sustained? Apart from an enigmatic mention of ‘a certain 
faithful memory of democratic reason and reason tout court’ (1997: 306), there is no 
clue.  
 
Nor, although many have turned to it for guidance, does the philosophy of Levinas 
provide, I would argue, many hints as to how we might sustain, let alone extend, its 
rethinking of morality into social practice and the possible refounding of politics. The 
unconditional, asymmetrical responsibility which Levinas argues we have towards the 
Other who faces us is prior to any social or cultural process; it is built into the prior 
constitution of the self. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it in his eloquent book Postmodern 
Ethics, ‘it is through stretching myself towards the Other that I have become the 
unique, the only, the irreplaceable self that I am’ (1992: 77). But how is this abstract 
vision of morality, which rejects any basis in something as contingent as consensus or 
mutuality, connectable to the progressive ‘remoralisation of human space’ for which 
Bauman calls (1992: 249, 240)?7  It is far from obvious. 
 
Something of the same impasse affects Jean-Luc Nancy’s evocation of ‘the 
inoperative community’ (1991). This ‘community’ is inoperative in the sense that it is 
sustained only through the absence of the rhetorical operations of reification, on 
which conventional notions of ‘community’ depend: ‘it is the work that the 
community does not do and it is not that forms community . . . Community is made of 
what retreats from it’ (1991: xxxix). Like Levinas, Nancy turns to the originary 
constitution of the self for value: our prior sense of ‘being in-common’ with others 
which is indissolubly tied to our knowledge of our and their mortality. We should 
beware of exaggerating the novelty of these formulations; the insistence on the 
necessary intersubjectivity of the self goes back at least to the 1930s US pragmatist 
George Herbert Mead.8 What is new here, however, beyond the elegantly paradoxical 
language, is not obviously helpful. For, by contrast with the US pragmatists like Mead 
and Dewey who connected philosophical issues to the social and cultural bases of 
democratic education and politics, Nancy turns his back on this: ‘community’ he 
writes ‘is the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical and institutional’ 
(1991: 31, added emphasis). ‘Community’, for Nancy, is something to be explored in 
the experience of seeing a friend die or in the philosophical foundations of literature, 
but not in anything that might readily be recognised as politics. Only one clue is 
offered, when Nancy addresses the word ‘political’ itself:  
 
‘“Political” would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking of its 
communication, or destined to this unworking: community consciously undergoing 
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the experience of its sharing . . . undergoing, in whatever manner, the experience of 
community as communication’ (1991: 40-41).   
 
Once again, there is an echo of pragmatism: recall John Dewey’s definition of 
communication as ‘the way in which people come to possess things in common’ 
(quoted Carey, 1989: 22). Nancy’s idea, however, of a community that undermines, 
rather than simply sustains, its own ‘unity’ is an important one to which I return.  
 
Ffor a less paradoxical account of the potential commonality that might ground any 
new politics, we can turn to work influenced by psychoanalytic conceptions of the 
self, not just in France but in Germany, Italy and the US. Kristeva’s proposal that we 
be more open to strangers by becoming ‘strangers to ourselves’ (1991) is well-known, 
but similar connections between a more inclusive politics and the interrogation of the 
self have been developed by Axel Honneth (1995) and Jessica Benjamin (1998). It is 
a powerful line of argument, since it confronts the intense investment in exclusion, 
that, whether or not you think within a psychoanalytic framework, is plausibly central 
to the constitution of the subject. Alessandro Ferrara (1998) has gone further and 
argued that psychoanalytic insights into the healthy subject can provide an intuitive 
basis for a new vision of ‘the good’, that translates Aristotle’s species-based notion of 
the ‘good for man’ into a shared, but always individually worked-out, value found in 
the richness of the life-narrative. At least one problem with this is that psychoanalytic 
perspectives on the self are themselves normalizing; they are based on a standard of 
the healthy, fulfilled self, which is hardly consensual, and that I, for one, would want 
to contest.  
 
These psychoanalytic accounts, however, represent a major step forward away from 
the abstractions of the ‘originary constitution of the self’ to questions of process – the 
processes, including narrative processes, through which selves emerge and evolve 
their reflexive understanding. This connects with the political sociologist Alain 
Touraine’s (2000) attempt to transvalue the standard terms of democratic discourse 
(‘freedom, solidarity, equality’) for a world where the nation as a founding ‘essence’ 
is neither desirable nor plausible. The way forward, Touraine argues, is through a new 
attention to ‘the Subject’:  
 
‘ . . . we have to replace the old idea of democracy, defined as participation in the 
general will, with the new idea of institutions that safeguard the freedom of the 
Subject and permit communication between Subjects’ (2000: 14).  
 
But what might these communicative institutions be? Or, more modestly, on what 
principles can they even be imagined? Once again, we are offered few clues by 
Touraine beyond this general statement. 
 
The only writer who I have found to offer a way forward here is the philosopher and 
narrative theorist, Paul Ricoeur. For Ricoeur, the self is always a narrated self: the self 
subsists through the never-completed stories it tells of itself. More than that, my 
individual story can never be sealed off from the stories others tell of themselves: ‘the 
life history of each of us is caught up in the histories of others’ (Ricoeur 1992: 161). 
This means that, in principle, each of us is disposed to be interested in the stories of 
others. What blocks, Ricoeur argues, a more open narrative exchange is the rigidity of 
collective identity, its tie to a founding event which must be kept unchanged, indeed 
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‘incommunicable’, to perform its political work (Ricoeur 1995: 7, quoted in Kaplan 
2003: 97). In rejecting the closure underlying collective identities, Ricoeur follows all 
the other writers I have discussed, but crucially he goes further in suggesting some 
specific practices that might allow us to move beyond such unsatisfactory identities. 
One is what Ricoeur calls a ‘translation ethos’ (or ‘language of hospitality’), that is, 
an openness to each other’s narrative languages. Another is the ‘exchange of 
memories’, that offer conflicting accounts of overlapping events. We need, Ricoeur 
implies, institutions where, across apparent differences of collective identity, we can 
exchange narratives of past experience that, through their exchange, encourage shared 
narratives of the future.9  
 
All this might seem to take me very far from the proper domain of a sociologist! But, 
as Touraine points out, if the crisis of democratic values runs as deep as many 
including him suggest, we cannot go on describing the social and political world as if 
nothing is changing. The very purpose of sociology, of critical social analysis in 
general, is at stake (2000: 11; cf Honneth, 1995: 207).  
 
So, to sum up my argument so far, we need a language and a practice (or form of life) 
that can connect across our anxious cross-disciplinary searches, first, for the 
regrounding of ethics and morality, second, for new models of democratic politics, 
and, third, for new analytic concepts for critically understanding the social world. In 
this spirit I want to ask what contribution cultural studies might make to developing 
that common language and practice. 
 
The Common Space of Cultural Studies 
 
1. Research Priorities  
 
Right away, let me stress that I have no illusions that cultural studies, more than any 
other academic subject, carries some automatic political force (there is no role now, as 
Bauman (1987) pointed out, for academic ‘legislators’; so an academic subject’s 
political  ‘force’ must be generated through the specific and practical connections it 
makes to the world beyond it). Nor do I have too many illusions about the difficulties 
which the intensified rationalisation of contemporary academic life poses for such a 
political practice, particularly when cultural studies itself, as we saw at Birmingham 
in summer 2002, is a specific target of just those pressures. Nor, given the wider 
problem, precisely, of making connections between specialised forms of life, does it 
make sense to speak as if research and teaching can be reformed in isolation from 
shifts in practices outside the academy. Any principles we develop must open out into 
the wider democratic dialogue that in my book Inside Culture (2000: 140) I tried to 
capture through the phrase ‘community without closure’ – a phrase that was itself 
unspecific, I admit, but to which I want to try and give some substance here.  
 
In doing so, I will be arguing for a research agenda for cultural studies that is rather 
different from its current one: this is intended not so much as a judgement on cultural 
studies’ past, as a proposal that if cultural studies is to contribute more concretely to 
the crisis of democratic politics than some of the philosophical positions that I have 
criticised, it must change its priorities. 
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So how, given these qualifications, might we imagine the contribution of cultural 
studies? By cultural studies, I mean, since the question of cultural studies’ disciplinary 
status seems permanently unresolved,10 the range of work across the social sciences 
and humanities that acknowledges the inspiration of cultural studies. 
 
Let’s start with two points. First, we must be realistic: such is the fragmentation of the 
intellectual public sphere, in Britain at least, and cultural studies’ dispersed and 
largely marginal position within it, that no single intervention is ever likely to have 
the impact that Raymond Williams’ book Culture and Society did in 1950s Britain. A 
more differentiated network of interventions is needed that is open in multiple ways to 
exchanges beyond conference hall and teaching room: in how cultural studies 
conceives the research work appropriate to it, in how it translates that research into 
writing and other interventions, in how it disseminates that research and feeds it into 
ideas for further research and wider non-academic dialogue. It follows (and this is the 
second point) that it makes no sense for cultural studies to limit its questions to those 
that arise in an academic framework, ignoring the most urgent issues that face the 
social and political world, including the very crisis in democratic politics that I have 
been discussing. 
 
Looking back to the situation faced by Raymond Williams, there is a striking parallel, 
as well as enormous differences. Williams articulated better than most around him the 
coming democratic crisis in a post-war society rigidly stratified by class, a Britain far 
from achieving the ‘new common experience’ that at the dawn of the welfare state T. 
H. Marshall (1992/ 1949: 33) had seen as central to its stable pact of citizenship. 
Marshall had used the terms ‘culture’ and ‘common experience’ in a cryptic way, but 
by forging those terms into the critical concept of ‘common culture’, Williams cut 
into the less than democratic languages and cultural politics of his day.  
 
The crisis of democratic politics is far from over (hence the continuity with Williams), 
but the forms and conceptual tools through which it can be addressed are necessarily 
very different after five decades in which the landscape of capacities and experiences 
we call ‘culture’ has been massively de-stratified in some respects and relentlessly 
individualised in others. The issue remains the building of connections to resist the 
fragmentation of the ‘world of discourse’ (Williams, 1968: 133), but the divisions to 
be resisted are not so much the barriers of taste that differentiate types of cultural 
work from each other, but rather the divisions that block off the sites of possible 
politics from the rest of life (Bauman, 1999: 2).  
 
There may now, in other words, be much less at stake in the general term ‘culture’ 
whose use, after all, has been endlessly expanded and whose political weight has been 
deconstructed to death (which is how I read the upshot of Tony Bennett’s (1998) 
work); and much more at stake in the idea of ‘common culture’, or at least (as I put it 
earlier) in the conceptual site that Williams intended to mark by that apparently 
defunct phrase. For what is urgent now is not defending the full range of cultural 
production and consumption from elitist judgement, but defending the possibility of 
any shared site (whether or not overlapping with specialised spheres of cultural 
production) for an emergent democratic politics. The contemporary mission of 
cultural studies, if it has one, lies not with the study of ‘culture’ (already a cliché of 
management and marketing manuals), but with the fate of a ‘common culture’, and its 
contemporary deformations. 
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There are many ways of developing this insight into specific research. One - perhaps 
the most direct which is not to claim it is necessarily the best - is to look for new 
empirical routes into the problem of ‘the political’, as it is currently experienced and 
constructed; to examine how, from a host of different perspectives, ‘the political’ is 
being constituted, reformed and suppressed. Already there is work on the discourses 
of ‘politics’ in circulation, or, just as important, not in circulation (for example, Engin 
Isin’s Foucauldian work on the construction of citizenship, or Henry Giroux’s and 
Loic Wacquant’s analyses of the displacement in US politics of issues of ‘race’ and 
exclusion).11 Indeed, turning specifically to the term ‘community’, it is some years 
since Nikolas Rose (1996) explored this word’s mobilisation in refiguring and 
desocialising the language of government. I want here, simply because it is closer to 
my own style of research, to focus on work with potential political subjects. Political 
subjects are important, because in their reflexivity can be sensed the local rhetorical 
work to which ‘the political’ and related terms are being put, or not put, and what, if 
anything, those subjects feel might still be at stake in these terms.  
 
This is an area where, with Sonia Livingstone and Timothy Markham at LSE,12 I am 
about to embark on a ESRC-funded project called ‘Media Consumption and the 
Future of Public Connection’. This project is definitely not aimed at reinforcing the 
rigid assumptions about the place or nature of politics that characterise most political 
science. Rather it will take a broadly social constructionist13 approach to politics, 
asking people who are not necessarily active in the formal political process for their 
reflections on where, if anywhere, a sphere of public connection lies beyond the 
private domain, and whether, if at all, media are involved in sustaining that 
connection. 
 
This will be a difficult project because, without denying the concern for the future of 
democratic politics that motivates it, we as researchers must avoid assuming we know 
better than anyone else where and even whether politics has a future. ‘Where’, 
because as Larry Grossberg argued in his unjustly neglected book We Gotta Get Out 
of This Place:  
 
‘the analyst cannot assume that she or he already knows the proper locations at 
which people should invest themselves and construct their belongingness. Nor can 
he or she assume that the connections between such sites are always given in 
advance, so that people’s travels through daily life are predictable.’ (1992: 110) 
 
We cannot assume ‘whether’ politics has a future, because that would be to ignore the 
particular privilege of the researcher as knowledge-producer (cf Bourdieu 2000) 
whose socially established role is precisely to elicit ‘opinions’ about matters already 
constructed as important in advance from the vantage-point of academic 
interpretation, whether or not they matter to the subjects of that research.14 This is 
why the best empirical studies of political alienation and disconnection – those on 
which I hope our new project will be able to build - leave it ambiguous whether such 
positions are rational in the face of entrenched inequalities, including the fundamental 
political inequality between those who act (but may not listen) and those who 
(normally) are acted upon (Croteau, 1995; LeBlanc 1999; Buckingham 2000).15  
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This, however, is just one possibility. There are many other ways to research the 
current fate of ‘the political’ and, in order not to close down our sights unnecessarily, 
we should take seriously the exclusions which the term ‘political’ itself entrenches. 
One possibility would be to shift the focus away from individuals studied in the 
artificial situation of ‘pure’ research, and towards the institutional contexts in which 
people and systems mobilise, negotiate, and displace ‘the political’ and related terms. 
Cultural studies could do more, I suggest, to study institutional sites of discourse that 
are a long way from the formal process of ‘politics’ as usually conceived, yet hardly 
divorced from questions of ‘the political’ or ‘community’:16 hospitals and schools, for 
example, as sites of formal work and voluntary work, both of them nodes in complex 
regulatory processes and spaces where class, educational and ethnic differences are 
daily negotiated.  
 
There are, in fact, many sites where cultural studies could be bolder in its 
interventions: the whole range of work settings where in various ways ‘the political’ 
is negotiated or evaded. But, as soon as we think this, it becomes clear that it cannot 
be enough to study those sites in isolation from the wider life-trajectories of those 
who pass through them – because ‘the political’ may be precisely what is excluded or 
marginalised in the sphere of ‘work’, and many sites of leisure too.  
 
To grasp this, attention must be paid to ‘politics’ in a different sense, the politics of 
speech or voice: the distribution, probably highly uneven, of people’s sense (not 
necessarily directed to any space called ‘politics’) of themselves as effective agents 
and legitimate voices. Conventional political science has long travelled this coast in 
researching ‘civic culture’ and ‘subjective efficacy’ (Almond and Verba, 1963), but it 
has rarely gone far inland. We approach here the territory of ‘identity politics’, 
usually discussed at the level of group allegiances. But in times when, for some, the 
very meaning of ‘community’ or ‘belonging’ is at issue (see quotes from Stevenson 
and Elliott earlier), we cannot limit our research to identities legitimated by group 
membership, unless we are prepared to ignore the space of individual uncertainty that 
lies beyond them. Nor, if we understand identities as, in a sense, ‘chosen’, should we 
ignore how people’s capacities to choose - or even their capacity to imagine 
themselves as agents who might choose - are shaped by the largely involuntary 
contexts of everyday work. This was brought home to me when, in a pilot for our 
ESRC study, involving questions posed to the UK’s Mass-Observation Archive Panel, 
a recently retired female nurse wrote in her response:  
 
‘if my views counted for nothing after 50 years doing the job I knew about, why 
should they count about other things I know less about?’17  
 
To be fair, these, as it were subterranean, connections between the crisis of formal 
politics and the undemocratic politics of work are beginning to be sensed within 
political science and political sociology (Bennett, 1998; Turner, 2001), but have not 
so far generated much empirical research.18  
 
Cultural studies, in the broad sense I defined it, has, I believe, a great deal to 
contribute here. This might sound a long way from some versions of cultural studies. 
It does not foreground as such cultural consumption or identity-expression through 
cultural consumption; nor does it foreground as such processes of cultural production 
– not because they are unimportant (although, as I suggest, less may be directly at 
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stake in these areas than once was the case), but because it aims to cut across those 
domains to foreground another set of questions about the intertwined fates of 
individual agency and democratic politics. In doing so, cultural studies is not ceding 
its territory to a revamped political sociology (in case this sounds like a reverse 
imperialism!), but rather bringing to the inter-disciplinary question of the 
preconditions of democratic politics its interest in agency and voice, and the forces 
that constrain them (cf Couldry, 2000: chapter 3), a contribution which needs to be 
heard clearly and by a wider audience. Cultural studies, of course, cannot here work 
on its own: the alliances it makes with other disciplines, on the face of it more directly 
concerned with the stuff of politics, are equally crucial. But before turning to that, 
first let me explain what I believe has to change in how cultural studies sees it own 
practice. 
 
2. Practice 
 
There are plenty of potential spaces for politics, perhaps, but the key lack in the 
political domain may now be time, not space (Turner, 2002: 28). In a wonderful essay 
on the significance of rhetoric, the philosopher Hans Blumenberg wrote that ‘what has 
been designated in our tradition as “rationality” has almost always benefited the 
element of acceleration . . . rhetoric, on the other hand, is, in regard to the temporal 
texture of actions, . . . a consummate embodiment of retardation’ (1987: 444-445). As 
a result: 
 
‘a disproportion has arisen between the acceleration of processes and the feasibility 
of keeping a “feel” for them, of intervening in them with decisions, or coordinating 
them, through an overview, with other processes  . . . [so that] There is something 
like the expediency of what is not expedient . . .’ (1987: 445-446) 
 
The resonance of this comment for the hyper-rationalised world of early twenty-first 
century educational institutions hardly needs explaining, but the implicit challenge 
must be articulated directly.  
 
Henry Giroux in an eloquent lecture delivered last year – ironically enough in that 
often complacent seat of ancient learning, Oxford University – posed the question: 
 
‘How might public time, with its unsettling refusal to be fixed or to collapse in the 
face of corporate time, be used to create pedagogical conditions that foster forms 
of self and social critique as part of a broader project of constructing alternative 
desires and critical modes of thinking, on the one hand, and democratic agents of 
change, on the other?’ (Giroux, 2003b: 160) 
 
Can cultural studies, then, through the dialogues that its research generates, aspire to 
be one fragment of that imagined ‘public time’? That, following Giroux, is what I 
want to argue. 
 
We are not, to be clear, talking here about some version of public cultural provision – 
an important but very different debate. What is at stake is cultural studies’ possible 
role in sustaining practices of public connection: practices through which people’s 
fragmented, uncertain, incomplete narratives of agency (and all our narratives are 
inherently incomplete, as Ricoeur reminds us) are valued, preserved, and made 
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available for exchange, while being related, analytically, to wider contexts of power. 
Cultural studies could - and this was Williams’ vision – contribute to sustaining 
dialogues that bridge the personal and the public, debate that engages with the current 
forms of politics and public culture (from music to film to literature to sport to spatial 
design), and the fragments of community embedded within them, while also being 
sharply critical, when necessary, of their contradictions and limitations. This is the 
space that Henry Giroux calls ‘public pedagogy’, intending it to apply well beyond 
the confines of academic institutions (Giroux, forthcoming); indeed this is a space 
whose horizon must extend into the less structured exchanges of civil society (even if 
our view of it there is easily blocked), if it is to have any meaning.19 
 
This space should be characterised by what Ricoeur calls ‘linguistic hospitality’, 
providing a threshold for the exchange of memories and narratives by self and others. 
It would involve listening, as Ricoeur emphasises, across difference, but on this point 
we can also go back to Raymond Williams, recalling what he says in Culture and 
Society: ‘wherever we have started from, we need to listen to others who have started 
from a different position’ (1958: 320). But it would be a process which made no 
claims to negate difference through false aspirations to completion or certainty. 
Remember how Raymond Williams sought to replace the false closures of mass 
culture thinking with a new uncertainty in cultural discourse: ‘to the degree that we 
find [that] formula inadequate for ourselves, we can wish to extend to others the 
courtesy of acknowledging the unknown’ (1958: 289, added emphasis). 20   
 
The public time of cultural studies might, of course, from one point of view - that of 
rationalisation and government – be ‘inexpedient’ (in Blumenberg’s word). Indeed, it 
would be a process that was ‘inoperative’ in Jean-Luc Nancy’s sense, undoing the 
false work of discourses which seek to construct ‘a unique and ultimate identity’ out 
of the potential openness of communication (Nancy, 1991: xxxviii), working against 
the sanctioned languages of ‘people’, ‘nation’, ‘society’, ‘culture’ and even ‘identity’. 
As such, it would enact Nancy’s enigmatic words about ‘a community ordering itself 
to the unworking of its communication’ while at the same time, and through that very 
process, ‘consciously undergoing the experience of its sharing’ (Nancy, 1991: 40).  
 
None of this, however, would matter much, if it were not embedded effectively within 
a sphere of public action. It is here we confront the crux between the work, say, of 
Paul Ricoeur and that of Hannah Arendt. Arendt, from a conservative perspective – 
but that does not, as Michael Warner (2002: 59) points out, make her insight any less 
powerful - saw in modernity ‘the loss of the public realm’ (1958: 55): the loss, that is, 
of an assured space of public significance where individuals can make sense of 
sacrificing their private time in order to speak to, and act in view of, others. Even if 
we think this too pessimistic, cultural studies can contribute nothing to the crisis of 
democratic politics unless in the course of its work, it makes connections beyond 
theory, within the space of politics itself. This is what I want to address in the final 
section. 
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3. The Link Back to Politics 
 
The imaginability, within the space of theory, of such recent visions of the 
preconditions for a renewed politics tells us nothing about whether life contexts exist 
in which such a politics might take root as practice. Practice is where real agents, 
formed and operating under major constraints but always with a local sense of 
possibility, choose what to do with their scarce resources, including their time; what, 
you might ask, can theories of narrative tell us about the choices which people in fact 
make?  
 
Indeed the ‘problem’ with individualization (and connected processes of ‘de-
socialization’ (Touraine, 2000), that have undermined older forms of social context, 
institutional and communal) is not that the social world has become drained of 
meaning (a lack for theorists to fill in), but that it is saturated by personal and public 
meanings whose trajectory, however, is more and more difficult to connect into any 
shared space of public action. The fear, derived from Arendt, that the public realm 
may no longer even be compatible with contemporary living conditions, even if for a 
while it remains imaginable by theorists, is summed up by Oscar Gandy with 
nightmarish clarity when he writes that ‘individuals may actually feel better about 
knowing less and less about the world around them’ (Gandy, 2002: 452). What if, 
against this background, all cultural studies’ sophisticated discussions about mutual 
understanding and questioning fed into, rather than challenged, this fragmentation of 
what I believe, following Habermas, we must go on calling the ‘public sphere’ 
(Habermas, 1989). 
 
I said earlier that it is, in part, through the connections it will make with the wider 
space of politics that cultural studies can contribute to the democratic crisis. By way 
of conclusion, let me try to develop this point in two stages.  
 
First, I want to answer the objection anticipated earlier that to spend so much time 
considering the preconditions of politics, as I have, is a diversion from the real matter 
in hand: politics itself. I have some sympathy with this: I have no liking for the 
‘politics’ of academic writing that treats the sustaining of its own (relatively) 
privileged voice as the substitute for political action. But we must also beware of 
being too impatient here. It is striking that the historic public realm Arendt describes 
as lost, perhaps irrevocably, shares one feature with the community that other thinkers 
from Williams to Nancy have been trying to envisage for the future. For the essential 
feature of the ‘public realm’ is its ‘publicity’. Publicity in Arendt’s sense, even if 
couched in an older language, shares something important with those more recent 
visions. Here is Arendt: 
 
‘being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that 
everybody sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public 
life.’ (1958: 57, added emphasis)  
 
The ability to acknowledge and listen to narratives told from different positions is 
crucial to the visions of Williams, Ricoeur, and Nancy. Which suggests two possible 
readings of those recent visions of the preconditions for politics: either as doomed in 
advance to search for something already lost or (the interpretation I prefer) as 
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returning in potentially a reinvigorated way to the path of a possible politics through 
public practices of mutual respect (cf Sennett, 2003).  
 
Such practices of respect and mutuality must, of course, reach many sites and 
networks, from cultural production to formal politics to the world of work. What is 
needed, however – and this is Arendt’s essential insight – is that in some way, those 
sites are connected, through a multitude of links, into a public space of shared 
significance and meaning. This is the emergent space that I have, provisionally, called 
a ‘community without closure’, a space that sustains practices of mutual openness to 
the uncertain accounts we are able to give of ourselves. But the name matters much 
less than the way we conceive the purpose of that space, which, while falling short of 
the achievement of politics, should enact one of its essential preconditions: that is, 
citizens’ mutual respect for each other’s inalienable capacity to contribute as agents to 
the public sphere. Cultural studies has, I believe, an important potential role in 
sustaining such a space.  
 
But this, of course, cannot be enough. There has to be a second stage at which cultural 
studies connects with the specific spaces of politics itself and, at the same time, 
connects with other disciplines working to contribute to the specific content of 
political debate. In disciplinary terms, the connection with political theory that 
interrogates not so much the preconditions for, as the proper process of, politics 
(particularly deliberative democracy theory) is vital.21 So too is the connection with 
the whole range of work across the social sciences and the policy arena that examines 
the nature of contemporary inequality and power. For it is ultimately in terms of this 
landscape that questions of voice and agency, and the violence done to them, matter; 
it is because the material conditions of speaking and acting in our own name are so 
unequally distributed that we must listen better to others; as Nancy Fraser (2000) has 
eloquently argued, we cannot leave the politics of recognition dangling, permanently 
disconnected from the politics of redistribution.  
 
In all this, of course, I have only begun to map what the contribution of cultural 
studies – a differently focussed, differently connected cultural studies – might be both 
to the crisis of democratic politics and to the future practice of politics itself. The 
specific contribution of cultural studies as a discipline, if taken by itself, can at best be 
modest. But it would hardly be trivial – not if, through the way it conceives, writes 
and disseminates its research, cultural studies helps enact a ‘public realm’ (in 
Arendt’s quaint but useful phrase) where it makes sense for us, and as yet unknown 
others, to exchange, critically and sceptically, the fragments left from earlier visions 
of ‘politics’ and ‘community’. How else, we might ask, could something new and 
worthy of the term ‘politics’ emerge?  
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 For example Beck (1997, 2000), Held (1995), Sassen (2002). 
 
3
 See in particular my recent work on media rituals (Couldry, 2003). 
 
4
 Cf Corlett (1989) on ‘community without unity’. 
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7
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